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Abstract
How to preserve users’ privacy while supporting
high-utility analytics for low-latency stream processing?
To answer this question: we describe the design, im-
plementation and evaluation of PRIVAPPROX, a data
analytics system for privacy-preserving stream process-
ing. PRIVAPPROX provides three properties: (i) Privacy:
zero-knowledge privacy guarantee for users, a privacy
bound tighter than the state-of-the-art differential pri-
vacy; (ii)Utility: an interface for data analysts to system-
atically explore the trade-offs between the output accu-
racy (with error-estimation) and the query execution bud-
get; (iii) Latency: near real-time stream processing based
on a scalable “synchronization-free”distributed architec-
ture.
The key idea behind our approach is to marry two tech-
niques together, namely, sampling (used in the context
of approximate computing) and randomized response
(used in the context of privacy-preserving analytics).
The resulting marriage is complementary — it achieves
stronger privacy guarantees and also improves the per-
formance for low-latency stream analytics.
1 Introduction
Many online services continuously collect users’ private
data for real-time analytics. Much of this data arrives as
a data stream and in huge volumes, requiring real-time
stream processing based on distributed systems [1–4].
In the current ecosystem of data analytics, the analysts
usually have direct access to the users’ private data, and
must be trusted not to abuse it. However, this trust has
been violated in the past [28, 57, 79, 87].
A pragmatic eco-system has two desirable, but contra-
dictory design requirements: (i) stronger privacy guaran-
tees for the users; and (ii) high-utility stream analytics
in real-time. Users seek stronger privacy, while analysts
strive for high-utility analytics in real time.
To meet these two design requirements, there is a
surge of novel computing paradigms that address these
concerns, albeit separately. Two such paradigms are
privacy-preserving analytics to protect user privacy and
approximate computation for real-time analytics.
Privacy-preserving analytics. Recent privacy-
preserving analytics systems favor a distributed archi-
tecture to avoid central trust (see §7 for details), where
users’ private data is stored locally on their respective
client devices. Data analysts use a publish-subscribe
mechanism to run aggregate queries over the distributed
private dataset of a large number of clients. Thereafter,
such systems add noise to the aggregate output to
provide useful privacy guarantees, such as differential
privacy [33]. Unfortunately, these state-of-the-art
systems normally deal with single-shot batch queries,
and therefore, these systems cannot be used for real-time
stream analytics.
Approximate computation. Approximate computation
is based on the observation that many data analytics jobs
are amenable to an approximate, rather than the exact
output (see §7 for details). For such an approximate
workflow, it is possible to trade accuracy by comput-
ing over a partial subset (usually selected via a sampling
mechanism) instead of the entire input dataset. Thereby,
data analytics systems based on approximate computa-
tion can achieve low latency and efficient utilization of
resources. However, the existing systems for approxi-
mate computation assume a centralized dataset, where
the desired sampling mechanism can be employed. Thus,
existing systems are not compatible with the distributed
privacy-preserving analytics systems.
The marriage. In this paper, we make the observation
that the two computing paradigms, privacy-preserving
analytics and approximate computation, are complemen-
tary. Both paradigms strive for an approximate instead
of the exact output, but they differ in their means and
goals for approximation. Privacy-preserving analytics
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adds explicit noise to the aggregate query result to pro-
tect users’ privacy. Whereas, approximate computation
relies on a representative sampling of the entire dataset to
compute over only a subset of data items to enable low-
latency/efficient analytics. Therefore, we marry these
two existing paradigms together in order to leverage the
benefits of both. The high-level idea is to achieve pri-
vacy (via approximation) by directly computing over a
subset of sampled data items (instead of computing over
the entire dataset) and then adding an explicit noise for
privacy-preservation.
To realize this marriage, we designed an approxima-
tion mechanism that also achieves privacy-preserving
goals for stream analytics. Our design (see Figure 1)
targets a distributed setting, similar as aforementioned,
where users’ private data is stored locally on their respec-
tive personal devices, and an analyst issues a streaming
query for analytics over the distributed private dataset of
users. The analyst’s streaming query is executed on the
users’ data periodically (a configurable epoch) and the
query results are transmitted to a centralized aggregator
via a set of proxies. The analyst interfaces with the ag-
gregator to get the aggregate query output periodically.
We employ two core techniques to achieve our goal.
Firstly, we employ sampling [74] directly at user’s site
for approximate computation, where each user randomly
decides whether to participate in answering the query in
the current epoch. Since we employ sampling at the data
source, instead of sampling at a centralized infrastruc-
ture, we are able to squeeze out the desired data size (by
controlling the sampling parameter) from the very “first
stage” in the analytics pipeline, which is essential in low-
latency environments.
Secondly, if the user participates in the query an-
swering process, we employ a randomized response [40]
mechanism to add noise to the query output at user’s site,
again locally at the source of the data in a decentralized
fashion. In particular, each user locally randomizes its
truthful answer to the query to achieve local differen-
tial privacy guarantees (§3.2.2). Since we employ noise
addition at the source of data, instead of adding the ex-
plicit noise to the aggregate output at a trusted aggrega-
tor or proxies, we enable a truly “synchronization-free”
distributed architecture, which requires no coordination
among proxies and the aggregator for the mandated noise
addition.
The last, but not the least, silver bullet of our de-
sign: it turns out that the combination of the two afore-
mentioned techniques (i.e., sampling and randomized re-
sponse) led us to achieve zero-knowledge privacy [45], a
privacy bound tighter than the state-of-the-art differential
privacy [33]. (We prove our claim in Appendix C.)
To summarize, we present the design and implementa-
tion of a practical system for privacy-preserving stream
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Figure 1: System overview
analytics in real time. In particular, our system is a novel
combination of the sampling and randomized response
techniques, as well as a scalable “synchronization-free”
routing scheme employing a light-weight XOR encryp-
tion scheme [26]. The resulting system ensures zero-
knowledge privacy, anonymization, and unlinkability for
users (§2.2.4). Altogether, we make the following con-
tributions:
• We present a marriage of sampling and random-
ized response to achieve improved performance and
stronger privacy guarantees.
• We present an adaptive query execution interface
for analysts to systematically make a trade-off be-
tween the output accuracy, and the query execution
budget.
• We present a confidence metric on the output ac-
curacy using a confidence interval to interpret the
approximation due to sampling and randomization.
To empirically evaluate our approach, we imple-
mented our design as a fully-functional prototype in a
system called PRIVAPPROX1 based on Apache Flink [1]
and Apache Kafka [8]. In addition to stream analyt-
ics, we further extended our system to support privacy-
preserving “historical” batch analytics over users’ private
datasets. The evaluation based onmicro-benchmarks and
real-world case-studies shows that this marriage is, in
fact, made in heaven!
2 Overview
In this section, we present an overview of our system
called PRIVAPPROX.
2.1 System Architecture
PRIVAPPROX is designed for privacy-preserving stream
analytics on distributed users’ private dataset. Figure 1
depicts the high-level architecture of PRIVAPPROX. Our
1 The source code of PRIVAPPROX along with the experimental
evaluation setup is publicly available :https://PrivApprox.github.io.
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system consists of four main components: clients, prox-
ies, aggregator, and analysts.
Clients locally store users’ private data on their respec-
tive personal devices, and subscribe to queries from the
system. Analysts publish streaming queries to the sys-
tem, and also specify a query execution budget. The
query execution budget can either be in the form of la-
tency guarantees/SLAs, output quality/accuracy, or the
available computing resources for query processing. Our
system ensures that the computation remains within the
specified budget.
At a high-level, the system works as follows: a query
published by an analyst is distributed to clients via the
aggregator and proxies. Clients answer the analyst’s
query locally over the users’ private data using a privacy-
preserving mechanism. Client answers are transmitted to
the aggregator via anonymizing proxies. The aggregator
aggregates received answers from the clients to provide
privacy-preserving stream analytics to the analyst.
2.2 System Model
Before we explain the design of PRIVAPPROX, we
present the system model assumed in this work.
2.2.1 Query Model
PRIVAPPROX supports the SQL query language for an-
alysts to formulate streaming queries. While queries can
be complex, the results of a query are expressed as counts
within histogram buckets, i.e., each bucket represents a
small range of query’s answer values. Specifically, each
query answer is represented in the form of binary buck-
ets, where each bucket stores a possible answer value
‘1’ or ‘0’ depending on whether or not the answer falls
into the value range represented by that bucket. For ex-
ample, an analyst can learn the driving speed distribu-
tion across all vehicles in San Francisco by formulating
an SQL query “SELECT speed FROM vehicle
WHERE location=‘San Francisco’”. The an-
alyst can then define 12 answer buckets on speed: ‘0’,
‘1∼10’, ‘11∼20’, · · · , ‘81∼90’, ‘91∼100’, and ‘> 100’.
If a vehicle is moving at 15 mph in San Francisco, it an-
swers ‘1’ for the third bucket and ‘0’ for all others.
Our query model supports not only numeric queries as
described above, but also non-numeric queries. For non-
numeric queries, each bucket is specified by a matching
rule or a regular expression. Note that, at first glance, our
query model may appear simple, it however supports a
range of queries such as histogram queries and frequency
queries. In addition, it has been shown to be effective for
a wide-range of analytics algorithms [18, 19].
2.2.2 Computation Model
PRIVAPPROX adopts a batched stream programming
model [1, 3] in which the online data stream is split
into small batches; and each small batch is processed
by launching a distributed data-parallel job. The batched
streaming model is adopted widely compared to trigger-
based systems [2, 4] for the following advantages: exact-
once semantics, efficient fault-tolerance, and a common
data-parallel programming model for both stream and
batch analytics.
In particular, PRIVAPPROX employs sliding window
computations over batched stream processing [16, 17].
For sliding windows, the computation window slides
over the input data stream, where the new incoming data
items are added, and the old data items are dropped from
the window as they become less relevant. Note that these
systems [1, 3] expose a time-based window length, and
based on the arrival rate, the number of data items within
a window may vary accordingly.
2.2.3 Threat Model
Analysts are potentially malicious. They may try to
violate the PRIVAPPROX’s privacy model, i.e., de-
anonymize clients, build profiles through the linkage of
requests and answers, or de-randomize (remove added
noise from) the answers.
Clients are potentially malicious. They could generate
false or invalid responses to distort the query result for
the analyst. However, we do not defend against the Sybil
attack [32], which is beyond the scope of this work [93].
Proxies are also potentially malicious. They may
transmit messages between clients and the aggregator in
contravention of the system protocols. PRIVAPPROX in-
cludes at least two proxies, and there are at least two
proxies which do not collude with each other.
The aggregator is assumed to be Honest-but-Curious
(HbC): the aggregator faithfully conforms to the system
protocol, but may try to exploit the information about
clients. The aggregator does not collude with any proxy,
nor the analyst.
Finally, we assume that all end-to-end communica-
tions use authenticated and confidential connections (are
protected by long-lived TLS connections), and no system
component could monitor all network traffic.
2.2.4 Privacy Properties
Our privacy properties include: (i) zero-knowledge pri-
vacy, (ii) anonymity, and (iii) unlinkability.
All aggregate query results in the system are inde-
pendently produced under zero-knowledge privacy guar-
antees. The chosen privacy metric zero-knowledge pri-
vacy [45] builds upon differential privacy [33] and pro-
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vides a tighter bound on privacy guarantees compared
to differential privacy. Informally, zero-knowledge pri-
vacy states that essentially everything that an adversary
can learn from the output of an zero-knowledge private
mechanism could also be learned using aggregate infor-
mation. Anonymity means that no system components
can associate query answers or query requests with a spe-
cific client. Finally, unlinkability means that no system
component can join any pair of query requests or answers
to the same client, even to the same anonymous client.
For the formal definitions, analysis, and proofs—refer
Appendix C.
2.2.5 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions.
1. We assume that the input stream is stratified based
on the source of event, i.e., the data items within
each stratum follow the same distribution, and are
mutually independent. Here a stratum refers to one
sub-stream. If multiple sub-streams have the same
distribution, they are combined to form a stratum.
2. We assume the existence of a virtual function that
takes the query budget as the input and outputs the
sample size for each window based on the budget.
3. We assume that the aggregator faithfully follows the
system protocol. We could use trusted computing
such as remote attestation [86] based on Trusted
Platform Modules (TPMs) to relax the HbC as-
sumption.
We discuss different possible means to meet the first
two assumptions in Appendix B.
3 Design
PRIVAPPROX consists of two main phases (see Figure 1):
submitting queries and answering queries. In the first
phase, an analyst submits a query (along with the execu-
tion budget) to clients via the aggregator and proxies. In
the second phase, the query is answered by the clients in
the reverse direction.
3.1 Submitting Queries
To perform statistical analysis over users’ private data
streams, an analyst creates a query using the querymodel
described in §2.2.1. In particular, each query consists of
the following fields, and is signed by the analyst for non-
repudiation:
Query := 〈QID,SQL,A[n], f ,w,δ 〉 (1)
• QID denotes a unique identifier of the query. This
can be generated by concatenating the identifier of
the analyst with a serial number unique to the ana-
lyst.
• SQL denotes the actual SQL query, which is passed
on to clients and executed on their respective per-
sonal data.
• A[n] denotes the format of a client’s answer to the
query. The answer is an n-bit vector where each bit
associates with a possible answer value in the form
of a “0” or “1” per index (or answer value range).
• f denotes the answer frequency, i.e., how often the
query needs to be executed at clients.
• w denotes the window length for sliding window
computations [16]. For example, an analyst may
only want to aggregate query results for the last
ten minutes, which means the window length is ten
minutes.
• δ denotes the sliding interval for sliding window
computations. For example, an analyst may want
to update the query results every one minute, and so
the sliding interval is set to one minute.
After forming the query, the analyst sends the query,
along with the query execution budget, to the aggregator.
Once receiving the pair of the query and query budget
from the analyst, the aggregator first converts the query
budget into system parameters for sampling (s) and ran-
domization (p,q). We explain these system parameters
in the next section §3.2. Hereafter, the aggregator for-
wards the query and the converted system parameters to
clients via proxies.
3.2 Answering Queries
After receiving the query and system parameters, we next
explain how the query is answered by clients and pro-
cessed by the system to produce the result for the ana-
lyst. The query answering process involves several steps
including (i) sampling at clients for low-latency approxi-
mation; (ii) randomizing answers for privacy preserva-
tion; (iii) transmitting answers for anonymization and
unlinkability; and finally, (iv) aggregating answers with
error estimation to give a confidence level on the approx-
imate output. We next explain the entire workflow us-
ing these four steps. (The algorithms are detailed in Ap-
pendix A.)
3.2.1 Step I: Sampling at Clients
We make use of approximate computation to achieve
low-latency execution by computing over a subset of data
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items instead of the entire input dataset. Specifically, our
work builds on sampling-based techniques [10, 12, 46,
63] in the context of “Big Data” analytics. Since we aim
to keep the private data stored at individual clients, PRI-
VAPPROX applies an input data sampling mechanism lo-
cally at the clients. In particular, we use Simple Random
Sampling (SRS) [74].
Simple Random Sampling (SRS). SRS is considered as
a fair way of selecting a sample from a given popula-
tion since each individual in the population has the same
chance of being included in the sample. We make use of
SRS at the clients to select clients that will participate in
the query answering process. In particular, the aggrega-
tor passes the sampling parameter (s) on to clients as the
probability of participating in the query answering pro-
cess. Thereafter, each client flips a coin with the proba-
bility based on the sampling parameter (s), and decides
whether to participate in answering a query. Suppose that
we have a population of U clients, and each client i has
an answer ai. We want to calculate the sum of these an-
swers across the population, i.e., ∑Ui=1 ai. To compute an
approximate sum, we apply the SRS at clients to get a
sample of U ′ clients. The estimated sum is then calcu-
lated as follows:
τˆ =
U
U ′
U ′
∑
i=1
ai± error (2)
Where the error bound error is defined as:
error = t
√
V̂ar(τˆ) (3)
Here, t is a value of the t-distribution withU ′−1 degrees
of freedom at the 1−α/2 level of significance, and the
estimated variance V̂ar(τˆ) of the sum is:
V̂ar(τˆ) =
U2
U ′
σ2(
U−U ′
U
) (4)
Where σ2 is the sample variance of sum.
Note that we currently assume that all clients pro-
duce the input stream with data items following the same
distribution, i.e., all clients’ data streams belong to the
same stratum. We further extend it for stratified sampling
in §3.3.
3.2.2 Step II: Answering Queries at Clients
Clients that participate in the query answering process
make use of the randomized response technique [40] to
preserve answer privacy, with no synchronization among
clients.
Randomized response. Randomized response protects
user’s privacy by allowing individuals to answer sensi-
tive queries without providing truthful answers all the
time, yet it allows analysts to collect statistical results.
Randomized response works as follows: suppose an an-
alyst sends a query to individuals to obtain the statistical
result about a sensitive property. To answer the query,
a client locally randomizes its answer to the query [40].
Specifically, the client flips a coin, if it comes up heads,
then the client responds its truthful answer; otherwise,
the client flips a second coin and responds “Yes” if it
comes up heads or “No” if it comes up tails. The privacy
is preserved via the ability to refuse responding truthful
answers.
Suppose that the probabilities of the first coin and the
second coin coming up heads are p and q, respectively.
The analyst receives N randomized answers from indi-
viduals, among which Ry answers are “Yes”. Then, the
number of original truthful “Yes” answers before the ran-
domization process can be estimated as:
Ey =
Ry− (1− p)× q×N
p
(5)
Suppose Ay and Ey are the actual and the estimated
numbers of the original truthful “Yes” answers, respec-
tively. The accuracy loss η is then defined as:
η =
∣∣∣∣Ay−EyAy
∣∣∣∣ (6)
It has been proven in [37] that, the randomized re-
sponse mechanism achieves ε-differential privacy [33],
where:
ε = ln
(Pr[Response= Yes|Truth=Yes]
Pr[Response= Yes|Truth= No]
)
(7)
More specifically, the randomized response mecha-
nism achieves ε-differential privacy, where:
ε = ln
( p+(1− p)× q
(1− p)× q
)
(8)
The reason is: if a truthful answer is “Yes”, then with
the probability of ‘p+(1− p)× q’, the randomized an-
swer will still remain “Yes”. Otherwise, if a truthful an-
swer is “No”, then with the probability of ‘(1− p)× q’,
the randomized answer will become “Yes”.
It is worth mentioning that, combining randomized
response with the sampling technique used in Step I,
we achieve not only differential privacy but also zero-
knowledge privacy [45] which is a privacy bound tighter
than differential privacy. We prove our claim in Ap-
pendix C.
3.2.3 Step III: Transmitting Answers via Proxies
After producing randomized responses, clients transmit
them to the aggregator via the proxies. To achieve
5
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Figure 2: XOR-based encryption with two proxies.
anonymity and unlinkability of the clients against the ag-
gregator and analysts, we utilize the XOR-based encryp-
tion together with source rewriting, which has been used
for anonymous communications [26, 27, 31, 84]. Under
the assumptions that:
• at least two proxies are not colluding
• the proxies don’t collude with the aggregator, nor
the analyst
• the aggregator and analyst have only a local view of
the network
neither the aggregator, nor the analyst will learn any
(pseudo-)identifier to deanonymize or link different an-
swers to the same client. This property is achieved by
source rewriting, which is a typical building block for
anonymization schemes [31, 84]. At the same time the
content of the answers is hidden from the proxies using
the XOR-based encryption.
XOR-based encryption. At a high-level, the XOR-
based encryption employs extremely efficient bit-wise
XOR operations as its cryptographic primitive compared
to expensive public-key cryptography. This allows us to
support resource-constrained clients, e.g., smartphones
and sensors. The underlying idea of this encryption is
simple: if Alice wants to send a message M of length
l to Bob, then Alice and Bob share a secret MK (in the
form of a random bit-string of length l). To transmit the
message M privately, Alice sends an encrypted message
‘ME =M⊕MK’ to Bob, where ‘⊕’ denotes the bit-wise
XOR operation. To decrypt the message, Bob again uses
the bit-wise XOR operation: M =ME ⊕MK.
Specifically, we apply the XOR-based encryption to
transmit clients’ randomized answers as follows. At first,
each randomized answer is concatenated with its associ-
ated query identifier QID to build a messageM:
M = QID,RandomizedAnswer (9)
Thereafter, the client generates (n− 1) random l-bit
key strings MKi with 2 ≤ i ≤ n using a cryptographic
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) seeded with
a cryptographically strong random number. The XOR of
all (n− 1) key strings together forms the secretMK .
MK =
n⊕
i=2
MKi (10)
Next, the client performs an XOR operation with M
andMK to produce an encrypted messageME .
ME =M⊕MK (11)
As a result, the message M is split into n mes-
sages 〈ME ,MK2 , · · · ,MKn〉. Afterwards, a unique mes-
sage identifier MID is generated, and sent along with the
split messages to the n proxies via anonymous channels
enabled by source rewriting [31, 84].
Client−→ Proxy1 : 〈MID,ME〉
Client−→ Proxyi : 〈MID,MKi〉
(12)
Upon receiving the messages (either 〈MID,ME〉 or
〈MID,MKi〉) from clients, the n proxies transmit these
messages to the aggregator.
The message identifier MID ensures that ME and all
associated MKi will be joined later to decrypt the origi-
nal message M at the aggregator. Note that, 〈MID,ME〉
and all 〈MID,MKi〉 are computationally indistinguish-
able, which hides from the proxies if the received data
contains the encrypted answer or is just a pseudo-random
bit string.
3.2.4 Step IV: Generating Result at the Aggregator
At the aggregator, all data streams (〈MID,ME〉 and
〈MID,MKi〉) are received, and can be joined together to
obtain a unified data stream. Specifically, the associated
ME and MKi are paired by using the message identifier
MID. To decrypt the original randomized message M
from the client, the XOR operation is performed overME
and MK : M = ME ⊕MK with MK being the XOR of all
MKi : MK =
⊕n
i=2MKi . As the aggregator cannot identify
which of the received messages is ME , it just XORs all
the n received messages to decryptM.
The joined answer stream is processed to produce the
query results as a sliding window. For each window,
the aggregator first adapts the computation window to
the current start time t by removing all old data items,
with timestamp < t, from the window. Next, the ag-
gregator adds the newly incoming data items into the
window. Then, the answers in the window are decoded
and aggregated to produce the query results for the an-
alyst. Each query result is an estimated result which
is bound to a range of error due to the approximation.
The aggregator estimates this error bound using equa-
tion 3 and produces a confidence interval for the result
as: queryResult± errorBound. The entire process is re-
peated for every window.
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Note that an adversarial client might answer a query
many times in an attempt to distort the query result.
However, we can handle this problem, for example, by
applying the triple splitting technique [26].
Error bound estimation. We provide an error bound
estimation for the aggregate query results. The accu-
racy loss in PRIVAPPROX is caused by two processes:
(i) sampling and (ii) randomized response. Since the ac-
curacy loss of these two processes is statistically inde-
pendent (see §5), we estimate the accuracy loss of each
process separately. Furthermore, Equation 2 indicates
that the error induced by sampling can be described as
an additive component of the estimated sum. The error
induced by randomized response is contained in the ai
values in Equation 2. Therefore, independent of the er-
ror induced by randomized response, the error coming
from sampling is simply being added upon. Following
this, we sum up both independently estimated errors to
provide the total error bound of the query results.
To estimate the accuracy loss of the randomized re-
sponse process, we make use of an experimental method.
We run several micro-benchmarks at the beginning of the
query answering process without performing the sam-
pling process, to estimate the accuracy loss caused by
randomized response. We measure the accuracy loss us-
ing Equation 6.
On the other hand, to estimate the accuracy loss of the
sampling process, we apply the statistical theory of the
sampling techniques. In particular, we first identify a de-
sired confidence level, e.g., 95%. Then, we compute the
margin of error using Equation 3. Note that, to use this
equation the sampling distribution must be nearly nor-
mal. According to the Central Limit Theorem (CLT),
when the sample sizeU ′ is large enough (e.g.,≥ 30), the
sampling distribution of a statistic becomes close to the
normal distribution, regardless of the underlying distri-
bution of values in the dataset [90].
3.3 Practical Considerations
Next, we present three design enhancements to improve
the practicality of PRIVAPPROX.
3.3.1 Stratified Sampling
As described in §3.2.1, we employ Simple Random Sam-
pling (SRS) at clients for approximate computation. The
assumption behind using SRS is that all clients produce
data streams following the same distribution, i.e., all
clients’ data streams belong to the same stratum. How-
ever, in a distributed environment, it may happen that dif-
ferent clients produce data streams with disparate distri-
butions.
Accommodating such cases requires that all strata are
considered fairly to have a representative sample from
each stratum. To achieve this we use the stratified sam-
pling technique [12, 63]. Stratified sampling ensures that
data from every stratum is proportionally selected (based
on the arrival rate) and none of the minorities are ex-
cluded.
To perform stratified sampling, instead of just one
sampling parameter s, we use a set of sampling parame-
ters S= {si} where i∈ {1, · · · ,n} (n is the number of dis-
parate distribution sub-streams in the input stream). All
clients within a given stratum i flip a sampling coin with
the probability si to decide on the participation in the an-
swering process. The value si is determined based on the
proportional arrival rate of the sub-stream (or stratum).
The rest of the answering process remains unchanged (as
in §3.2.2).
Accordingly, we adapt the error estimation for strat-
ified sampling to provide a confidence interval for the
query result. Suppose the clients C come from n sources
(disjoint strata) C1, C2 · · · , Cn, i.e., C = ∑
n
i=1Ci, and the
ith stratumCi has Bi clients and each such client j has an
associated answer ai j in binary format.
To compute an approximate sum of the “Yes” answers,
we first select a sample from all clients C based on the
stratified sampling, i.e., we sample bi items from each i
th
stratum Ci. Then we estimate the sum from this sample
as: τˆ = ∑ni=1(
Bi
bi
∑
bi
j=1 ai j)± ε where the error bound ε is
defined as:
ε = t f ,1− α2
√
V̂ar(τˆ) (13)
Here, t f ,1− α2
is the value of the t-distribution (i.e., t-
score) with f degrees of freedom and α = 1 − confi-
dence level. The degree of freedom f is calculated as:
f =
n
∑
i=1
bi− n (14)
The estimated variance for the sum, V̂ar(τˆ), can be
expressed as:
V̂ar(τˆ) =
n
∑
i=1
Bi ∗ (Bi− bi)
r2i
bi
(15)
Here, r2i is the population variance in the i
th stratum.
Similar to the SRS described in §3.2.1, we use the statis-
tical theories [90] for stratified sampling to calculate the
error bound.
3.3.2 Historical Analytics
In addition to providing real-time data analytics, we fur-
ther extended PRIVAPPROX to support historical analyt-
ics. The historical analytics workflow is essential for the
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data warehousing setting, where analysts wish to ana-
lyze user behaviors over a longer time period. To fa-
cilitate historical analytics, we support the “batch analyt-
ics” over the users’ data at the aggregator. The analyst
can analyze users’ responses stored in a fault-tolerance
distributed storage (HDFS) at the aggregator to get the
aggregate query result over the desired time period.
We further extend the adaptive execution interface for
historical analytics, where the analyst can specify query
execution budget, for example, to suit dynamic pricing
in spot markets in the cloud deployment. Based on the
query budget, we perform an additional round of sam-
pling at the aggregator to ensure that batch analytics
computation remains within the query budget. We omit
the sampling details at the aggregator due to space con-
straints.
3.3.3 Query Inversion
In the current setting, some queries may result in very
few “Yes” truthful answers in users’ responses. For such
cases, PRIVAPPROX can only achieve lower utility as the
fraction of truthful “Yes” answers gets far from the sec-
ond randomization parameter q (see experimental results
in §5). For instance, if q is set to a high value (e.g.,
q= 0.9), having few “Yes” answers in the user responses
will affect the overall utility of the query result.
To address this issue, we propose a query inversion
mechanism. If the fraction of truthful “Yes” answers
is too small or too large compared to the q value, then
the analysts can invert the query to calculate the truthful
“No” answers instead of the truthful “Yes” answers. In
this way, the fraction of truthful “No” answers gets closer
to q, resulting in a higher utility of the query result.
4 Implementation
We implemented PRIVAPPROX as an end-to-end stream
analytics system. Figure 3 presents the architecture of
our prototype. Our system implementation consists of
three main components: (i) clients, (ii) proxies, and (iii)
the aggregator.
First, the query and the execution budget specified by
the analyst are processed by the initializermodule
to decide on the sampling parameter (s) and the random-
ization parameters (p and q). These parameters along
with the query are then sent to the clients.
Clients. We implemented Java-based clients for mo-
bile devices as well as for personal computers. A client
makes use of the sampling parameter (based on the
sampling module) to decide whether to participate in
the query answering process (§3.2.1). If the client de-
cides to participate then the query answer module
is used to execute the input query on the local user’s
Client
...
Proxies
(Apache Kafka & Zookeeper)
Aggregator
(Apache Flink)
XOR -based
encryption
Query
answering
Sampling at
client Proxy # 1
(pub/sub)
Proxy # n
(pub/sub) XOR-based
decryption
Aggregation
Initializer
Data
analytics
Error
estimation
Streaming
query & budget
Query
result
Query distribution
Query answering
Analyst
Figure 3: Architecture of PRIVAPPROX prototype
private data stored in SQLite [6]. The client makes
use of the randomized response to execute the query
(§3.2.2). Finally, the randomized answer is encrypted
using the XOR-based encryption module; there-
after, the encrypted message and the key messages are
sent to the aggregator via proxies (§3.2.3).
Proxies. We implemented proxies based on Apache
Kafka (which internally uses Apache Zookeeper [5] for
fault tolerance). In Kafka, a topic is used to define a
stream of data items. A stream producer can publish
data items to a topic, and these data items are stored
in Kafka servers called brokers. Thereafter, a consumer
can subscribe to the topic and consume the data items by
pulling them from the brokers. In particular, we make
use of Kafka APIs to create two main topics: key and
answer for transmitting the key message stream and the
encrypted answer stream in the XOR-based encryption
protocol, respectively (§3.2.3).
Aggregator. We implemented the aggregator using
Apache Flink for real-time stream analytics and also for
historical batch analytics. At the aggregator, we first
make use of the join method (using the aggregation
module) to combine the two data streams: (i) en-
crypted answer stream and (ii) key stream. Thereafter,
the combined message stream is decoded (using the
XOR-based decryption module) to reproduce the
randomized query answers. These answers are then for-
warded to the analytics module. The analyticsmod-
ule processes the answers to provide the query result
to the analyst. Moreover, the error estimation
module is used to estimate the error (§3.2.4), which we
implemented using the Apache Common Math library.
If the error exceeds the error bound target, a feedback
mechanism is activated to re-tune the sampling and ran-
domization parameters to provide higher utility in the
subsequent epochs.
For the historical analytics, we asynchronously store
the (randomized responses) data in HDFS [20] at the ag-
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gregator (as a separate pipeline, which is not shown in
Figure 3 for simplicity). To support historical analytics
on the stored data at the aggregator, we also implemented
a sampling method sample() in Flink to support our sam-
pling mechanism (§3.3.2).
5 Evaluation: Microbenchmarks
In this section, we evaluate PRIVAPPROX using a series
of microbenchmarks. For all microbenchmark measure-
ments, we report the average over 100 runs.
#I: Effect of sampling and randomization parame-
ters.
We first measure the effect of randomization parame-
ters on the utility and the privacy guarantee of the query
results. In particular, the utility is measured by the query
results’ accuracy loss (Equation 6), and privacy is mea-
sured by the level of achieved zero-knowledge privacy
(Equation 19). For the experiment, we generated 10,000
original answers randomly, 60% of which are “Yes” an-
swers. The sampling parameter s is set to 0.6.
Table 1 shows that different settings of the two ran-
domization parameters, p and q, do affect the utility and
the privacy guarantee of the query results. The higher p
means the higher probability that a client responds with
its truthful answer. As expected, this leads to higher
utility (i.e., smaller accuracy loss η) but weaker privacy
guarantee (i.e., higher privacy level ε). In addition, Ta-
ble 1 also shows that the closer we set the probability
q to the fraction of truthful “Yes” answers (i.e., 60% in
this microbenchmark), the higher utility the query result
provides. Nevertheless, to meet the utility and privacy
requirements in various scenarios, we should carefully
choose the appropriate p and q. In practice, the selection
of the ε value depends on real-world applications [64].
We also measured the effect of sampling parameter
on the accuracy loss. Figure 4 (a) shows that the accu-
racy loss decreases with the increase of sampling frac-
Table 1: Utility and privacy of query results with differ-
ent randomization parameters p and q.
p q Accuracy loss (η) Privacy Level (ε)
0.3
0.3 0.0278 1.7047
0.6 0.0262 1.3862
0.9 0.0268 1.2527
0.6
0.3 0.0141 2.5649
0.6 0.0128 2.0476
0.9 0.0136 1.7917
0.9
0.3 0.0098 4.1820
0.6 0.0079 3.5263
0.9 0.0102 3.1570
tion, regardless of the settings of randomization param-
eters p and q. The benefits reach diminishing returns
after the sampling fraction of 80%. The system operator
can set the sampling fraction using resource prediction
model [97–99] for any given SLA.
#II: Error estimation. To analyze the accuracy loss,
we first measured the accuracy loss caused by sampling
and randomized response separately. For comparison,
we also computed the total accuracy loss after running
the two processes in succession as in PRIVAPPROX. In
this experiment, we set the number of original answers
to 10,000 with 60% of which being “Yes” answers. We
measure the accuracy loss of the randomized response
process by setting the sampling parameter to 100% (s=
1) and the randomization parameters p and q to 0.3 and
0.6, respectively. Meanwhile, we measure the accuracy
loss of the sampling process without the randomized re-
sponse process by setting p to 1.
Figure 4 (b) represents that the accuracy loss during
the two experiments is statistically independent to each
other. In addition, the accuracy loss of the two processes
can effectively be added together to calculate the total
accuracy loss.
#III: Effect of the number of clients. We next analyzed
how the number of participating clients affects the utility
of the results. In this experiment, we fix the sampling
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Table 2: Comparison of crypto overheads (# operations/sec). The public-key crypto schemes use a 1024-bit key.
Encryption Decryption
Phone Laptop Server Phone Laptop Server
RSA [13] 937 16× 2,770 341× 4,909 275× 126 25890× 698 23666× 859 26401×
Goldwasser [27] 2,106 7× 17,064 55× 22,902 59× 127 25686× 6,329 2610× 7,068 3209×
Paillier [83] 116 129× 489 1930× 579 2335× 72 45308× 250 66076× 309 73392×
PRIVAPPROX 15,026 943,902 1,351,937 3,262,186 16,519,076 22,678,285
and randomization parameters s, p and q to 0.9, 0.9 and
0.6, respectively, and set the fraction of truthful “Yes”
answers to 60%.
Figure 4 (c) shows that the utility of query results im-
proves with the increase of the number of participating
clients, and few clients (e.g., < 100) may lead to low-
utility query results.
Note that increasing the number of participating
clients leads to higher network overheads. However, we
can tune the number of clients using the sampling pa-
rameter s and thus decrease the network overhead (see
§6.2.2).
#IV: Effect of the fraction of truthful answers. We
also measured the utility of both the native and the in-
verse query results with different fractions of truthful
“Yes” answers. For the experiment, we still keep the
sampling and randomization parameters s, p and q to 0.9,
0.9 and 0.6, respectively, and set the total number of an-
swers to 10,000.
Figure 5 (a) shows that PRIVAPPROX achieves higher
utility as the fraction of truthful “Yes” answers gets
closer to 60% (i.e., the q value). In addition, when the
fraction of truthful “Yes” answers y is too small com-
pared to the q value (e.g., y = 0.1), the accuracy loss is
quite high at 2.54%. However, by using the query inver-
sion mechanism (§3.3.3), we can significantly reduce the
accuracy loss to 0.4%.
#V: Effect of answer’s bit-vector sizes. We measured
the throughput at proxies with various bit-vector sizes
of client answers (i.e., A[n] in §3.1). We conducted this
experiment with a 3-node cluster (see §6.1 for the exper-
imental setup). Figure 5 (b) shows that the throughput,
as expected, is inversely proportional to the answer’s bit-
vector sizes.
#VI: Effect of stratified sampling. To illustrate the
use of stratified sampling, we generated a synthetic data
stream with three different stream sources S1, S2, S3.
Each stream source is created with an independent Pois-
son distribution. In addition, the three stream sources
have an arrival rate of 3 : 4 : 5 data items per time unit,
respectively. The computation window size is fixed to
10,000 data items.
Figure 5 (c) shows the average number of selected
items of each stream source with varying sample frac-
tions using the stratified sampling mechanism. As ex-
pected, the average number of sampled data items from
each stream source is proportional to its arrival rate and
the sample fractions.
#VII: Computational overhead of crypto operations.
We compared the computational overhead of crypto
operations used in PRIVAPPROX and prior systems. In
particular, these crypto operations are XOR in PRIVAP-
PROX, RSA in [13], Goldwasser-Micali in [27], and Pail-
lier in [83]. For the experiment, we measured the number
of crypto operations that can be executed on: (i) Android
Galaxy mini III smartphone running Android 4.1.2 with
a 1.5 GHz CPU; (ii)MacBook Air laptop with a 2.2 GHz
Intel Core i7 CPU running OS X Yosemite 10.10.2; and
(iii) Linux server running Linux 3.15.0 equipped with a
2.2 GHz CPU with 32 cores.
Table 2 shows that the XOR operation is extremely ef-
ficient compared with the other crypto mechanisms. This
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Table 3: Throughput (# operations/sec) at clients
No. of operations/sec Phone Laptop Server
SQLite read 1,162 19,646 23,418
Randomized response 168,938 418,668 1,809,662
XOR encryption 15,026 943,902 1,351,937
Total 1,116 17,236 22,026
highlights the importance of XOR encryption in our de-
sign.
#VIII: Throughput at clients. We measured the
throughput at clients. In particular, we measured the
number of operations per second that can be executed
at clients for the query answering process. In this exper-
iment, we used the same set of devices as in the previous
experiment.
Table 3 presents the throughput at clients. To further
investigate the overheads, we measured the individual
throughput of three sub-processes in the query answer-
ing process: (i) database read, (ii) randomized response,
and (iii) XOR encryption. The result indicates that the
performance bottleneck in the answering process is actu-
ally the database read operation.
#IX: Comparison with related work. First, we
compared PRIVAPPROX with SplitX [26], a high-
performance privacy-preserving analytics system. We
compare the latency incurred at proxies in both PRIVAP-
PROX and SplitX. SplitX is geared towards batch ana-
lytics, but can be adapted to enable privacy-preserving
data analytics over data streams. Since PRIVAPPROX
and SplitX share the same architecture, we compare the
latency incurred at proxies in both systems.
Figure 6 shows that, with different numbers of clients,
the latency incurred at proxies in PRIVAPPROX is al-
ways nearly one order of magnitude lower than that
in SplitX. The reason is simple: unlike PRIVAPPROX,
SplitX requires synchronization among its proxies to
process query answers in a privacy-preserving fashion.
This synchronization creates a significant delay in pro-
cessing query answers, making SplitX unsuitable for
dealing with large-scale stream analytics. More specif-
ically, in SplitX, the processing at proxies consists of a
few sub-processes including adding noise to answers, an-
swer transmission, answer intersection, and answer shuf-
fling; whereas, in PRIVAPPROX, the processing at prox-
ies contains only the answer transmission. Figure 6 also
shows that with 106 clients, the latency at SplitX is 40.27
sec, whereas PRIVAPPROX achieves a latency of just
6.21 sec, resulting in a 6.48× speedup compared with
SplitX.
Next, we compared PRIVAPPROX with a re-
cent privacy-preserving analytics system called RAP-
POR [91]. Similar to PRIVAPPROX, RAPPOR applies
a randomized response mechanism to achieve differen-
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tial privacy. However, RAPPOR is not designed for
stream analytics, and therefore, we compared PRIVAP-
PROX with RAPPOR for privacy only. To make an
“apple-to-apple” comparison between PRIVAPPROX and
RAPPOR in terms of privacy, we make a mapping be-
tween the system parameters of the two systems. We set
the sampling parameter s = 1, and the randomized pa-
rameters p = 1− f , q = 0.5 in PRIVAPPROX, where f
is the parameter used in the randomized response pro-
cess of RAPPOR [91]. In addition, we set the number of
hash functions used in RAPPOR to 1 (h = 1) for a fair
comparison. In doing so, the two systems have the same
randomized response process. However, since PRIVAP-
PROX makes use of the sampling mechanism before per-
forming the randomized response process, PRIVAPPROX
achieves stronger privacy. Figure 7 shows the differential
privacy level of RAPPOR and PRIVAPPROX with differ-
ent sampling fractions s.
It is worth mentioning that, by applying the sam-
pling mechanism, PRIVAPPROX achieves stronger pri-
vacy (i.e., zero-knowledge privacy) for clients. The com-
parison between differential privacy and zero-knowledge
privacy is presented in the Appendix C.
Recently, several privacy-preserving stream analytics
systems have been proposed [51, 94, 96]. These systems
make use of the Laplace mechanism [33, 35] to achieve
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differential privacy. In particular, they add Laplace noise
to the truthful answers at the aggregator to protect the
users’ privacy. However, their approach relies on strong
trust assumptions of the aggregator as well as the connec-
tion between clients and the aggregator. On the contrary,
PRIVAPPROX applies randomized response mechanism
to process users’ private data locally at clients under the
control of users. Combined with the sampling mech-
anism, PRIVAPPROX achieves stronger privacy guaran-
tees (with a tighter bound for εdp-differential privacy and
εzk-zero-knowledge privacy).
6 Evaluation: Case-studies
We next present our experience using PRIVAPPROX in
the following two case studies: (i)NewYork City (NYC)
taxi ride, and (ii) household electricity consumption.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Cluster setup. We used a cluster of 44 nodes connected
via a Gigabit Ethernet. Each node contains 2 Intel Xeon
quad-core CPUs and 8 GB of RAM running Debian 5.0
with Linux kernel 2.6.26. We deployed two proxies with
Apache Kafka, each of which consists of 4 Kafka bro-
ker nodes and 3 Zookeeper nodes. We used 20 nodes to
deploy Apache Flink as the aggregator. In addition, we
employed the remaining 10 nodes to replay the datasets
to generate data streams for evaluating our PRIVAPPROX
system.
Datasets. For the first case study, we used the NYC Taxi
Ride dataset from the DEBS 2015 Grand Challenge [60].
The dataset consists of the itinerary information of all
rides across 10,000 taxies in New York City in 2013. For
the second case study, we used the Household Electricity
Consumption dataset [7]. This dataset contains electric-
ity usage (kWh) measured every 30 minutes for one year
by smart meters.
Queries. For the NYC taxi ride case-study, we created
a query: “What is the distance distribution of taxi trips
in New York?”. We defined the query answer with 11
buckets as follows: [0, 1) mile, [1, 2) miles, [2, 3) miles,
[3, 4) miles, [4, 5) miles, [5, 6) miles, [6, 7) miles, [7, 8)
miles, [8, 9) miles, [9, 10) miles, and [10,+∞) miles.
For the second case-study, we defined a query to ana-
lyze the electricity usage distribution of households over
the past 30 minutes. The query answer format is as fol-
lows: [0, 0.5] kWh, (0.5, 1] kWh, (1, 1.5] kWh, (1.5, 2]
kWh, (2, 2.5] kWh, and (2.5, 3] kWh.
Evaluation metrics. We evaluated our system using
four key metrics: throughput, latency, utility, and privacy
level. Throughput is defined as the number of data items
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Figure 8: Throughput at proxies and the aggregator with
different numbers of CPU cores and nodes.
processed per second, and latency is defined as the to-
tal amount of time required to process a certain dataset.
Utility is the accuracy loss defined as | estimate−exact
exact
|,
where estimate and exact are the query results produced
by applying PRIVAPPROX and the native computation,
respectively. Finally, privacy level (εzk) is calculated us-
ing equation 19. For all measurements, we report the
average over 10 runs.
6.2 Results from Case-studies
6.2.1 Scalability
We measured the scalability of the two main system
components: proxies and the aggregator. We first mea-
sured the throughput of proxies with various numbers
of CPU cores (scale-up) and different numbers of nodes
(scale-out). This experiment was conducted on a clus-
ter of 4 nodes. Figure 8 (a) shows that, as expected, the
throughput at proxies scales quite well with the number
of CPU cores and nodes. In the NYC Taxi case-study,
with 2 cores, the throughput of each proxy is 512,348
answers/sec, and with 8 cores (1 node) the throughput
is 1,192,903 answers/sec; whereas, with a cluster of 4
nodes each with 8 cores, the throughput of each proxy
reaches 2,539,715 answers/sec. In the household elec-
tricity case-study, the proxies achieve relatively higher
throughput because the message size is smaller than in
the NYC Taxi case-study.
We next measured the throughput at the aggregator.
Figure 8 (b) depicts that the aggregator also scales quite
well when the number of nodes for aggregator increases.
The throughput of the aggregator, however, is much
lower than the throughput of proxies due to the relatively
expensive join operation and the analytical computa-
tion at the aggregator. We notice that the throughput
of the aggregator in the household electricity case study
does not significantly improve in comparison to the first
case study. This is because the difference in the size of
messages between the two case studies does not affect
much the performance of the join operation and the
analytical computation.
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6.2.2 Network Bandwidth and Latency
Next, we conducted the experiment to measure the net-
work bandwidth usage. By leveraging the sampling
mechanism at clients, our system reduces network traffic
significantly. Figure 10 (a) shows the total network traf-
fic transferred from clients to proxies with different sam-
pling fractions. In the first case study, with the sampling
fraction of 60%, PRIVAPPROX can reduce the network
traffic by 1.62×; whereas in the second case study, the
reduction is 1.58×.
Besides the benefit of saving network bandwidth, PRI-
VAPPROX achieves also lower latency in processing
query answers by leveraging approximate computation.
To evaluate this advantage, we measured the effect of
sampling fractions on the latency of processing query
answers. Figure 10 (b) depicts the latency with differ-
ent sampling fractions at clients. For the first case-study,
with the sampling fraction of 60%, the latency is 1.68×
lower than the execution without sampling; whereas, in
the second case-study this value is 1.66× lower than the
execution without sampling.
6.2.3 Utility and Privacy
Figure 9 (a)(b)(c) show the utility, the privacy level, and
the trade-off between them, respectively, with different
sampling and randomization parameters. The random-
ization parameters p and q vary in the range of (0, 1), and
the sampling parameter s is calculated using Equation 19.
Here, we show results only for NYC Taxi dataset. As the
sampling parameter s and the first randomization param-
eter p increase, the utility of query results improves (i.e.,
accuracy loss gets smaller) whereas the privacy guaran-
tee gets weaker (i.e., privacy level gets higher). Since the
New York taxi dataset is diverse, the accuracy loss and
the privacy level change in a non-linear fashion with dif-
ferent sampling fractions and randomization parameters.
Interestingly, the accuracy loss does not always decrease
as the second randomization parameter q increases. The
accuracy loss gets smaller when q = 0.3. This is due to
the fact that the fraction of truthful “Yes” answers in the
dataset is 33.57% (close to q= 0.3).
6.2.4 Historical Analytics
To analyze the performance of PRIVAPPROX for histor-
ical analytics, we executed the queries on the datasets
stored at the aggregator. Figure 11 (a) (b) present the la-
tency and throughput, respectively, of processing histor-
ical datasets with different sampling fractions. We can
achieve a speedup of 1.86× over native execution in his-
torical analytics by setting the sampling fraction to 60%.
We also measured the accuracy loss when the approx-
imate computation was applied (for the NYC Taxi case-
study). Figure 11 (c) shows the accuracy loss in pro-
cessing historical data with different sampling fractions.
With the sampling fraction of 60%, the accuracy loss is
only less than 1%.
7 Related Work
Privacy-preserving analytics. Since the notion of dif-
ferential privacy [33, 35], a plethora of systems have
been proposed to provide differential privacy with cen-
tralized trusted databases supporting linear queries [66],
graph queries [61], histogram queries [56], Airavat-
MapReduce [85], SQL-type PINQ queries [71, 72, 80]
and even general programs, such as GUPT [73] and
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Figure 11: Historical analytics results with varying sampling fractions: (a) Latency, (b) Throughput, and (c) Utility.
Fuzz [54]. In practice, however, such central trust can
be abused, leaked, or subpoenaed [28, 57, 79, 87].
To overcome the limitations of the centralized
database schemes, recently a flurry of systems have
been proposed with a focus on achieving users’ pri-
vacy (mostly, differential privacy) in a distributed set-
ting where the private data is kept locally. Examples in-
clude Privad [49], PDDP [27], DJoin [75], SplitX [26],
piBox [65], KISS [92], Koi [50], xBook [89], Pop-
corn [52], and many other systems [13, 34, 55]. How-
ever, these systems are designed to deal with the “one-
shot” batch queries only, whereby the data is assumed to
be static during the query execution.
To overcome the limitations of the aforementioned
systems, several differentially private stream analytics
systems have been proposed recently [21, 22, 36, 41, 53,
83, 88]. Unfortunately, these systems still contain several
technical shortcomings that limit their practicality. One
of the first systems [36] updates the query result only
if the user’s private data changes significantly, and does
not support stream analytics over an unlimited time pe-
riod. Subsequent systems [22, 53] remove the limit on
the time period, but introduce extra system overheads.
Some systems [83, 88] leverage expensive secret shar-
ing cryptographic operations to produce noisy aggregate
query results. These protocols, however, cannot work
at large scale under churn; moreover, in these systems,
even a single malicious user can substantially distort
the aggregate results without detection. Recently, some
other privacy-preserving distributed stream monitoring
systems have been proposed [21, 41]. However, they all
require some form of synchronization, and are tailored
for heavy-hitter monitoring only. Streaming data pub-
lishing systems like [94] use a stream-privacy metric at
the cost of relying on a trusted party to add noise. In con-
trast, PRIVAPPROX does not require a trusted proxy or
aggregator to add noise. Furthermore, PRIVAPPROX pro-
vides stronger privacy properties (zero-knowledge pri-
vacy).
Sampling and randomized response. Sampling and
randomized response, also known as input perturba-
tion techniques, are being studied in the context of
privacy-preserving analytics, albeit they are explored
separately. For instance, the relationship between sam-
pling and privacy is being investigated to provide k-
anonymity [24], differential privacy [73], and crowd-
blending privacy [44]. In contrast, we show that
sampling combined with randomized response achieves
the zero-knowledge privacy, a privacy bound strictly
stronger that the state-of-the-art differential privacy. Fur-
thermore, PRIVAPPROX achieves these guarantees for
stream processing with a distributed private dataset.
Randomized response [40, 95] is a surveying tech-
nique in statistics, since 1960s, for collecting sensitive
information via input perturbation. Recently, Google, in
a system called RAPPOR [91], made use of randomized
response for privacy-preserving analytics for the Chrome
browser. RAPPOR provides differential privacy (εdp) for
clients while enabling analysts to collect various types
of statistics. Like RAPPOR, PRIVAPPROX utilizes ran-
domized response. However, RAPPOR is designed for
heavy-hitter collection, and does not deal with the situa-
tion where clients’ answers to the same query are chang-
ing over time. Therefore, RAPPOR does not fit well with
the stream analytics. Furthermore, since we combine
randomized response with sampling, PRIVAPPROX (εzk)
provides a privacy bound tighter than RAPPOR (εdp).
Secure multi-party computation. In theory, secure
multi-party computation (SMC) [47, 101] could be used
for privacy-preserving analytics. It is, however, expen-
sive for real-world deployment, especially for stream an-
alytics, even though there have been several proposals
reducing SMC’s computational overhead [48, 59, 67, 68,
77, 100]. Furthermore, SMC guarantees input-privacy
during computation, but is orthogonal to output-privacy
as provided by differential privacy.
Approximate computing. Approximation techniques
such as sampling [14, 25, 43], sketches [30], and online
aggregation [58] have been well-studied over the decades
in the databases community. Recently, sampling-based
systems (such as ApproxHadoop [46], BlinkDB [11, 12],
IncApprox [63], Quickr [10], StreamApprox [82]) and
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online aggregation-based systems (such as MapReduce
Online [29, 76], G-OLA [102]) have also been shown ef-
fective for “Big Data” analytics.
We build on the advancements of sampling-based
techniques. However, we differ in two crucial aspects.
First, we perform sampling in a distributed way as op-
posed to sampling in a centralized dataset. Second, we
extend sampling with randomized response for privacy-
preserving analytics.
8 Conclusion
In this technical report, we presented PRIVAPPROX, a
privacy-preserving stream analytics system. Our ap-
proach builds on the observation that both computing
paradigms — privacy-preserving data analytics and ap-
proximate computation — strive for approximation, and
can be combined together to leverage the benefits of both.
Our evaluation shows that PRIVAPPROX not only im-
proves the performance to support real-time stream an-
alytics, but also achieves provably stronger privacy guar-
antees than the state-of-the-art differential privacy. This
technical report is the complete version of our conference
publication [81]. PRIVAPPROX’s source code is publicly
available: https://PrivApprox.github.io.
Appendices
A Algorithms
In this section, we describe the algorithmic details of
PRIVAPPROX’s system protocol. We present two algo-
rithms: (i) the workflow at a client carrying out sampling
and randomization; and (ii) the workflow at the aggrega-
tor.
#I: Workflow at a client. Algorithm 1 summarizes how
a client processes a query. Each client maintains its per-
sonal data in a local database. Upon receiving a query,
the client first flips a sampling coin to decide whether
to answer the query or not. If the coin comes up heads,
then the client executes the query on its local database
to create a truthful answer to the query. The truthful
answer is in the form of bit buckets with a “1” or “0”
per bucket, depending on whether or not the “Yes” an-
swer falls within that bucket. The answer may have more
than one bucket containing a “1” depending on the query.
Next, the client randomizes the answer using the ran-
domized response mechanism. In particular, the client
flips the first randomization coin, if it comes up heads,
the client responds its truthful answer. If it comes up
tails, then the client flips the second randomization coin
and reports the result of this coin flipping. The random-
ized answer is still in the binary string format after the
Algorithm 1 Answering a query at clients
Input: Query and query budget
s, p,q← costFunction(budget); // s is the sampling parameter
// p and q are the randomizing parameters
A[n]← Query.A[n]; // Answer bit-vector
execute—At—Client() //Execute the method every f seconds
begin
f lipResult0← coinFlip(s);// Flip the sampling coin
if f lipResult0 ==“Heads” then
client.participate ← “True” ;
truth f ulAnswer ←
localDataProcess(Query.SQL);
f lipResult1← coinFlip(p); // First randomizing coin
if f lipResult1 ==“Heads” then
A[n]← truth f ulAnswer; // Process the local data
end
else
f lipResult2← coinFlip(q); // Second coin
if f lipResult2 ==“Heads” then
// for all “Yes” in the bit-vector
∀i ∈ {1, ...,n}: if(A[i] == 1) A[i]← 1;
end
else
// for all “No” in the bit-vector
∀i ∈ {1, ...,n}: if(A[i] == 1) A[i]← 0;
end
end
sendAnswer(A[n]); // Send the answer to the aggregator
end
end
randomization process.
#II: Workflow at the aggregator. The aggregator re-
ceives clients’ data streams from the proxies, and joins
them to obtain a combined data stream. Thereafter, the
aggregator processes the joined stream to produce the
output for the analyst. Algorithm 2 describes the over-
all process at the aggregator. The algorithm computes
the query results as a sliding window computation over
the incoming answer stream. For each window, the ag-
gregator first adapts the computation window to the cur-
rent start time t by removing all old data items, i.e., with
timestamp< t, from the computation window. Next, the
aggregator adds the new incoming data items in the win-
dow and decrypts the answers in the data stream. There-
after, the input data items for a window are aggregated
to produce the query output for the analyst. We also
estimate the error in the output due to approximation
and randomization. The aggregator estimates this error
bound and defines a confidence interval for the result
as: queryResult± errorbound. The entire process is re-
peated for the next window, with the updated window-
ing parameters and query budget (for the adaptive execu-
tion).
B Discussion
In this section, we discuss some approaches that could be
used to meet our assumptions listed in §2.2.5.
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Algorithm 2 Generating query result at the aggrega-
tor
Input: w← query.time window; δ ← query.slide interval;
t ← start time of window;
execute—At—Aggregator() //Execute the method every δ seconds
begin
window← /0; // List of items in the window
foreach (window w in the incoming stream ) do
forall elements in w do
if element.timestamp < t then
w.remove(element); // Remove all old items
end
end
w← w.insert(new items); // Add new items
queryResult ← /0; // query result
forall answer in the sample do
queryAnswer ← decryptAnswer(answer);
// Get query results associate with analyst IDs
queryResult ←
aggregateAnswer(queryAnswer);
end
queryResult ± error←
estimateError(queryResult);
t ← t + δ ; // Update the start time for the next window
end
end
Stratified sampling. In our design in §3, we currently
assume that the input stream is already stratified based
on the source of event, i.e., the data items within each
stratum follow the same distribution. However, it may
not be the case. We next discuss two proposals for
the stratification of evolving data streams, namely boot-
strap [38, 39, 78] and semi-supervised learning [70].
Bootstrap [38, 39, 78] is a well-studied non-parametric
sampling technique in statistics for the estimation of dis-
tribution for a given population. In particular, the boot-
strap method randomly selects “bootstrap samples” with
replacement to estimate the unknown parameters of a
population; for instance, by averaging the bootstrap sam-
ples. We can employ a bootstrap-based estimator for the
stratification of incoming sub-streams. Alternatively, we
could also make use of a semi-supervised algorithm [70]
to stratify a data stream. The advantage of the algorithm
is that it can work with both the labeled and unlabeled
data stream to train a classification model.
Virtual cost function. Currently, in our implementation
described in §4, for a given user-specified query bud-
get about privacy εzk, the sampling and randomizing pa-
rameters can be computed using the reversed function
of equation 19. However, for the query budget involv-
ing available computing resources or latency require-
ments (SLAs)—we currently assume that there exists a
virtual function that determines the sampling parame-
ter based on the query budget. We recommend two ex-
isting approaches—Pulsar [15] and resource prediction
model [42, 69]—to design and implement such a virtual
function for the given computing resources and latency
requirements, respectively.
Pulsar [15] is a “virtual datacenter (VDC)” system
that allows users to allocate resources based on tenants’
demand. The system proposes a multi-resource token
bucket algorithm that uses a pre-advertised cost model
for supporting workload independent guarantees. We
could apply a similar cost model based on Pulsar as fol-
lows: A data item to be processed could be considered
as a request, and “amount of resources” needed to pro-
cess these items could be the cost in tokens. Since the
resource budget gives total resources (here tokens) to be
used, we could find the number of clients, i.e., the sam-
pling fraction at clients, that can be processed using these
resources.
To find the sampling parameter for a given latency
budget, we could use a resource prediction model [97–
99]. The resource prediction model could build by an-
alyzing the diurnal patterns of resource usage [23], and
predicts the resource requirement to meet SLAs leverag-
ing statistical machine learning [42, 69]. Once we have
the resource requirement in place to meet a given SLA—
we can find the appropriate sampling parameter by using
the above suggested method similar to Pulsar.
C Privacy Analysis and Proofs
PRIVAPPROX achieves three privacy properties (i) zero-
knowledge privacy, (ii) anonymity, and (iii) unlinkability
as introduced in §2.2.4.
Property # I: Zero-knowledge privacy. We show
that the system designed in Section 3 achieves εzk-zero-
knowledge privacy and prove a tighter bound for εdp-dif-
ferential privacy, than what generally follows from zero-
knowledge privacy [45]. The basic idea is that all data
from the clients is already differentially private due to
the use of randomized response. Furthermore, the com-
bination with pre-sampling at the clients makes it zero-
knowledge private as well. Following the privacy defini-
tions, any computation upon the results of differentially,
as well as, zero-knowledge private algorithms is guaran-
teed to be private again.
In the following paragraphs we show that:
• Independent and identically distributed (IID) sam-
pling decomposes easily and is self-commutative.
See Lemma C.1.
• Sampling and randomized response mechanisms
commute. See Lemma C.2.
• Pre-sampling and post-sampling can be traded ar-
bitrarily around a randomized response mechanism.
See Corollary C.3.
• A εzk-zero-knowledge privacy bound for our sys-
tem. See Theorem C.4
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• A εdp-differential privacy bound for our system.
See Theorem C.5
• Our differential privacy bound is tighter than the
general differential privacy bound derived from a
zero-knowledge private algorithm. See Proposi-
tion C.6.
Intuitively, differential privacy limits the information
that can be learned about any individual i by the differ-
ence occurring from either including i’s sensitive data in
a differentially private computation or not. Zero-knowl-
edge privacy on the other hand also gives the adversary
access to aggregate information about the remaining in-
dividuals denoted asD−i. Essentially everything that can
be learned about individual i can also be learned by hav-
ing access to some aggregate information upon D−i.
Let San() be a sanitizing algorithm, which takes a
database D of sensitive attributes ai of individuals i ∈ P
from a population P as input and outputs a differentially
private or zero-knowledge private result San(D). For
brevity, we write SanA(D) for the output of the adversary
A with arbitrary external input z and access to San(D).
Similarly, we omit the explicit usage of the external in-
formation z as input to the simulator S, as well as the total
size of the database. See [44] Definition 1 and 2 for the
extended notation. Let O ⊆ Range(SanA) be any set of
possible outputs. εdp-differential privacy can be defined
as
Pr[SanA(D) ∈ O]≤ e
εdp ·Pr[SanA(D−i) ∈ O] (16)
while εzk-zero-knowledge privacy is defined as
Pr[SanA(D) ∈ O]≤ e
εzk ·Pr[S(T (D−i), |D|) ∈O]. (17)
Before proving the desired properties, we need to in-
troduce some notation. Let D = {ai} be a database
of sensitive attributes of individuals i ∈ P. For ease
of presentation and without loss of generality we re-
strict the individual’s sensitive attribute to a boolean
value ai ∈ {0,1} and D = ai′ for all i
′ ∈ P. Further-
more, let D(D) = {U : U ⊆ D} be the super-set of
all possible databases and Sam(D,u) : D(D)× (0,1)→
D(D) be a randomized algorithm that i.i.d. samples
rows or individuals with their sensitive attributes from
database D with probability s without replacement. Let
San(D, p,q) : D(D)× (0,1)× (0,1) → D(D) be a two-
coin randomized response algorithm that decides for any
individual i′ in database D with probability p if it should
be part of the output. If it is not included in the output,
the result of tossing a biased coin (coming up heads with
probability q) is added to the output.
Lemma C.1. (Decompose and commute sampling) Let
s = uv with s,u,v ∈ (0,1) being sampling probabilities
for a sampling function Sam(). It follows that Sam() can
be composed and decomposed easily and is self-commu-
tative.
Sam(D,s)≈ Sam(Sam(D,u),v)
≈ Sam(Sam(D,v),u).
Proof. Let Samu,Samv be sampling algorithms that sam-
ple rows i.i.d. from a database with probability u and v
respectively. By applying Samu(D), any row in D has
probability u of being sampled. The probability for any
row in D being sampled by Samv is equivalently v. Us-
ing function composition the probability for any row in
D being sampled by Sams = (Samu ◦ Samv)(D) is
s= uv. (18)
From multiplication being commutative (u · v = v · u)
follows that Samu and Samv commute, that is Samu ◦
Samv = Samv ◦Samu. This is true for deterministic func-
tions and can easily be extended to randomized functions
described as random variables, as random variables are
commutative under addition and multiplication. For ease
of presentation and without loss of generality we keep
the notion of functions instead of random variables. Let
Sams(D) = Sam(D,s) be a sampling function that sam-
ples rows i.i.d. from a given database D with probability
s. Decomposing sampling function Sams() with proba-
bility s into two functions with probabilities u and v fol-
low from Equation (18). It also follows that two sam-
pling functions with probabilities u,v can be composed
into a single sampling function with sampling probabil-
ity s.
Lemma C.2. (Commutativity of sampling and
randomized response) Given a sampling algo-
rithm Sam() and a randomized response algorithm
San(), the result of the pre-sampling algorithm
Fpre(D,s, p,q) = San(Sam(D,s), p,q) is statistically
indistinguishable from the result of the post-sampling
algorithm Fpost(D,s, p,q) = Sam(San(D, p,q),s). It fol-
lows that sampling and randomized response commute
under function composition: Sam◦ San= San ◦ Sam.
Proof. For any individual i having ai ∈Dwe have to con-
sider eight different possible cases. In case the sampling
algorithm Sam() decides to not sample i, it obviously
doesn’t matter if it gets removed before the randomized
response algorithm is run of afterwards. We thus condi-
tion on Sam() to include i in the output.
1. Let us first consider the case that San() outputs the
real value for individual i. As Sam() is fixed to out-
put i independent of its value, there is no difference
between Fpre and Fpost .
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2. In case San() outputs a randomized answer Sam()
again is not influenced by the outcome of any of the
coin tosses and passes i along to the output. This is
of course also independent of the actual randomized
result.
This concludes the proof that sampling and randomized
response are independent regarding their order of execu-
tion and thus commute.
Corollary C.3. (Arbitrary sampling around randomized
response) Let s= uv for s,u,v ∈ (0,1) be sampling prob-
abilities for a sampling function Sam() and San() be a
two-coin randomized response mechanism with proba-
bilities (p,q). Sampling can be arbitrarily traded be-
tween pre-sampling and post-sampling around the ran-
domized response mechanism San.
San(Sam(D,s), p,q)≈ Sam(San(Sam(D,u), p,q),v)
≈ Sam(San(D, p,q),s).
Proof. This follows directly from applying Lemma C.1
and Lemma C.2.
We will now give a bound on εzk for the privacy of
our system under the zero-knowledge privacy setting, as
well as derive a tighter bound for (εdp)-differential pri-
vacy, than the bound that generally follows from zero-
knowledge privacy.
TheoremC.4. (εzk-zero-knowledge privacy) Let A be an
algorithm that applies sampling with probability s, to-
gether with a two-coin randomized response algorithm
using probabilities (p,q). A is εzk-zero-knowledge pri-
vate with
εzk = ln
(
s
2− s
1− s
(
p+(1− p)q
(1− p)q
)
+(1− s)
)
. (19)
The system design is described in Section 3.
Proof. From [44], Theorem 1 follows that a (k,εrr)-
crowd-blending private mechanism combinedwith a pre-
sampling using probability s achieves ε-zero-knowledge
privacy with
εzk = ln
(
s ·
(
2− s
1− s
eεrr
)
+(1− s)
)
.
We omit the description for the additive error δ , which
can be derived equivalently from [44] Theorem 1. Fol-
lowing Proposition 1 from [44] every εrr-differentially
private mechanism is also k,εrr-crowd-blending private,
thus randomized response being an εrr-differentially pri-
vate mechanism, also satisfies (k,εrr)-crowd-blending
privacy with k = 1. Combining both results with Equa-
tion (8) εrr = ln
(
p+(1−p)q
(1−p)q
)
gives an
εzk = ln
(
s ·
(
2− s
1− s
(
p+(1− p)q
(1− p)q
))
+(1− s)
)
zero-knowledge private mechanism for randomized re-
sponse combined with pre-sampling. Using Corol-
lary C.3 we can replace pre-sampling with a combination
of pre- and post-sampling (with probabilities u,v respec-
tively and s= u ·v) while keeping εzk fixed. We thus have
εzk = ln
(
uv
2− uv
1− uv
(
p+(1− p)q
(1− p)q
)
+(1− uv)
)
.
If we do not aim at achieving zero-knowledge privacy,
we can fall back to differential privacy using the result
from [45], Proposition 3, which states that any ε-zero-
knowledge private algorithm is also 2ε-differentially pri-
vate. Using the results from sampling secrecy [62],
which achieve a privacy boost by applying pre-sampling
before using a differentially private algorithm, we derive
a tighter bound for differential privacy, than what follows
generally from zero-knowledge privacy.
Theorem C.5. (εdp-differential privacy) Let A be an al-
gorithm that applies sampling with probability s, fol-
lowed by a two-coin randomized response algorithm us-
ing probabilities (p,q). A is εdp-differentially private
with
εdp = ln
(
1+ s
(
p+(1− p)q
(1− p)q
− 1
))
. (20)
Proof. We use the result from [9], Proof of Lemma 3,
which bounds an εrr-differential private algorithm com-
bined with pre-sampling using probability s by εdp =
ln(1+ s(exp(εrr)− 1)). Let εrr = ln
(
p+(1−p)q
(1−p)q
)
be the
bound derived for randomized response, we get
εdp = ln
(
1+ s
(
p+(1− p)q
(1− p)q
− 1
))
.
Applying Corollary C.3 we derive an εdp bound for the
combination of pre-sampling, randomized response and
post-sampling of:
εdp = ln
(
1+(uv)
(
p+(1− p)q
(1− p)q
− 1
))
.
Proposition C.6. (Tighter εdp-differential privacy
bound) The bound εdp for differential privacy of
a sampled randomized response system derived in
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Figure 12: Ratio of
εzk
εdp
depending on the sampling pa-
rameter s for different values p and q.
Theorem C.5 is tighter than εzk-differential privacy,
which is again tighter than the general 2εzk-differential
privacy bound that follows from εzk-zero-knowledge
privacy [45].
We directly proof Proposition C.6 by comparing εdp
from Theorem C.5 with εzk from Theorem C.4. As we
want to prove a bound that is tighter than ε , we drop the
factor of 2. This is possible because a ε-differentially
private algorithm is also 2ε-differentially private. If we
succeed in proving a bound tighter than ε , then 2ε-
differential privacy is trivially fulfilled.
Proof. Proposition 3 from [45] states that ev-
ery ε-zero-knowledge private algorithm is also
2ε-differentially private. Using Theorem C.4
we get a εzk-differentially private system with
2εzk = 2ln
(
s 2−s1−s
(
p+(1−p)q
(1−p)q
)
+(1− s)
)
. Theorem C.5
proves a bound of εdp = ln
(
1+ s
(
p+(1−p)q
(1−p)q − 1
))
.
Let eεrr = p+(1−p)q
(1−p)q
. Putting together Theorem C.5,
Theorem C.4, Proposition C.6 and Proposition 3 [45] we
have:
ln
(
1+ s
(
p+(1− p)q
(1− p)q
−1
))
< ln
(
s
2− s
1− s
(
p+(1− p)q
(1− p)q
)
+(1− s)
)
s
(
p+(1− p)q
(1− p)q
−1
)
<
2− s
1− s
s
(
p+(1− p)q
(1− p)q
−1
)
s(eεrr −1)<
2− s
1− s
s(eεrr −1)
1<
2− s
1− s
As s ∈ (0,1) is the sampling parameter with a minimal
right side for smin = argmins∈(0,1)
(
2−s
1−s
)
= 0 the above
inequality becomes 1 < 2, which holds and concludes
the proof.
Relation of differential privacy and zero-knowledge
privacy. Zero-knowledge privacy and differential pri-
vacy describe the advantage ε of an adversary in learning
information about individual i by using an output from
an algorithm San() running over database D containing
sensitive information ai ∈ D of individual i compared to
using a result of a second — possibly different — al-
gorithm San′() running over D−i. Zero-knowledge pri-
vacy is a strictly stronger privacy metric through the ad-
ditional access to aggregate information of the remain-
ing database D−i compared to differential privacy [45].
By intuition, as differential privacy is a special case of
zero-knowledge privacy and the adversary aims at max-
imizing its advantage, the advantage of an adversary in
the zero-knowledge model is at least as high and pos-
sibly higher than the advantage of an adversary in the
differential privacy model: εzk ≥ εdp. Figure 12 draws
the ratio
εzk
εdp
between the zero-knowledge privacy level
εzk and the differential privacy level εdp given identical
parameters p,q and s. Put differently, as the adversary
is allowed to do more in the zero-knowledge model, the
privacy level is lower, which is reflected by a higher εzk
value compared to the differential privacy level εdp —
given identical system parameters.
Property # II: Anonymity. We make the following as-
sumptions to achieve the remaining two privacy proper-
ties:
(A1) At least two out of the n proxies are not colluding.
(A2) The aggregator does not collude with any of the
proxies.
(A3) The aggregator and analysts cannot — at the same
time — observe the communication around the
proxies.
(A4) The adversary, seen as an algorithm, lies within the
polynomial time complexity class.
To provide anonymity, we require that no system com-
ponent (proxy, aggregator, analyst) can relate a query re-
quest or answer to any of the clients. To show the ful-
fillment of that requirement we take the view of all three
parties.
a) A proxy can of course link the received data stream
to a client, as it is directly connected. However, as
the data stream is encrypted, it would need to have the
plaintext query request or response for the received data
stream. To get the plaintext the proxy would either need
to break symmetric cryptography, which breaks assump-
tion (A4), collude with all other proxies for decryption,
which breaks assumption (A1) or collude with the ag-
gregator to learn the plaintext, which breaks assumption
(A2).
b) Anonymity against the aggregator is achieved by
source-rewriting, which is a standard anonymization
technique typically used by proxies and also builds the
basis for anonymization schemes [31, 84]. To break
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anonymity the aggregator must be a global, passive at-
tacker, which means that he is able to simultaneously lis-
ten to incoming and outgoing traffic of any proxy. This
would violate assumption (A3). The other possibility to
bridge the proxies is by colluding with any of them —
breaking assumption (A2).
c) The analyst knows the query request, but doesn’t get
to learn the single query answers. He needs to collude
with the aggregator, to see single responses. Thus the
problem reduces to breaking anonymity from the view
of the aggregator. Collusion with the aggregator and any
proxy would break assumption (A2). Collusion with up
to n− 1 proxies reduces to breaking anonymity from the
proxy view.
Property # III: Unlinkability. Unlinkability is pro-
vided by the source-rewriting scheme as in anonymity.
Breaking unlinkability on any proxy is similar to break-
ing anonymity, as the proxy would need to get the plain-
text query. The aggregator only gets query results, but no
source information, as this is hidden by the anonymiza-
tion scheme. The query results sent by the clients also do
not contain linkable information, just identically struc-
tured answers without quasi-identifiers. The view of the
analyst doesn’t receive responses, so it must collude with
either a proxy or the aggregator, effectively reducing to
the same problem as described above.
Acknowledgements. We would like to thank Amazon
for providing us an Amazon Web Services (AWS) Edu-
cation Grant.
References
[1] Apache Flink. https://flink.apache.org/.
Accessed: Jan, 2017.
[2] Apache S4. http://incubator.apache.org/
s4. Accessed: Jan, 2017.
[3] Apache Spark Streaming. http://spark.apache.
org/streaming. Accessed: Jan, 2017.
[4] Apache Storm. http://storm-project.net/.
Accessed: Jan, 2017.
[5] Apache Zookeeper. https://zookeeper.
apache.org/. Accessed: Jan, 2017.
[6] Kafka - A high-throughput distributed messaging sys-
tem. http://kafka.apache.org. Accessed: Jan,
2017.
[7] Sample household electricity time of use data.
https://goo.gl/0p2QGB. Accessed: Jan, 2017.
[8] SQLite. https://www.sqlite.org/. Accessed:
Jan, 2017.
[9] Differential privacy and the secrecy of the sample, Sept.
2009.
[10] Quickr: Lazily Approximating Complex Ad-Hoc
Queries in Big Data Clusters. InProceedings of the ACM
SIGMOD International Conference on Management of
Data (SIGMOD), 2016.
[11] S. Agarwal, H. Milner, A. Kleiner, A. Talwalkar, M. Jor-
dan, S. Madden, B. Mozafari, and I. Stoica. Knowing
when You’Re Wrong: Building Fast and Reliable Ap-
proximate Query Processing Systems. In Proceedings
of the ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Man-
agement of Data (SIGMOD), 2014.
[12] S. Agarwal, B. Mozafari, A. Panda, H. Milner, S. Mad-
den, and I. Stoica. BlinkDB: Queries with Bounded Er-
rors and Bounded Response Times on Very Large Data.
In Proceedings of the ACM European Conference on
Computer Systems (EuroSys), 2013.
[13] I. E. Akkus, R. Chen, M. Hardt, P. Francis, and
J. Gehrke. Non-tracking web analytics. In Proceedings
of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security (CCS), 2012.
[14] M. Al-Kateb and B. S. Lee. Stratified Reservoir Sam-
pling over Heterogeneous Data Streams. In Proceedings
of the 22nd International Conference on Scientific and
Statistical Database Management (SSDBM), 2010.
[15] S. Angel, H. Ballani, T. Karagiannis, G. O’Shea, and
E. Thereska. End-to-end performance isolation through
virtual datacenters. In Proceedings of the USENIX Con-
ference on Operating Systems Design and Implementa-
tion (OSDI), 2014.
[16] P. Bhatotia, U. A. Acar, F. P. Junqueira, and R. Ro-
drigues. Slider: Incremental Sliding Window Analyt-
ics. InProceedings of the 15th International Middleware
Conference (Middleware), 2014.
[17] P. Bhatotia, M. Dischinger, R. Rodrigues, and
U. A. Acar. Slider: Incremental Sliding-Window Com-
putations for Large-Scale Data Analysis. In Technical
Report: MPI-SWS-2012-004, 2012.
[18] A. Blum, C. Dwork, F. McSherry, and K. Nissim. Practi-
cal privacy: the SuLQ framework. In Proceedings of the
ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Prin-
ciples of Database Systems (PODS), 2005.
[19] A. Blum, K. Ligett, and A. Roth. A Learning Theory
Approach to Non-interactive Database Privacy. In Pro-
ceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Comput-
ing (STOC), 2008.
[20] D. Borthakur. The hadoop distributed file system: Ar-
chitecture and design. Hadoop Project Website, 2007.
[21] T.-H. H. Chan, M. Li, E. Shi, and W. Xu. Differ-
entially Private Continual Monitoring of Heavy Hitters
from Distributed Streams. In Proceedings of the 12th
International Conference on Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies (PETS), 2012.
[22] T.-H. H. Chan, E. Shi, and D. Song. Private and Contin-
ual Release of Statistics. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.,
2011.
[23] R. Charles, T. Alexey, G. Gregory, H. K. Randy, and
K. Michael. Towards understanding heterogeneous
clouds at scale: Google trace analysis. Technical report,
2012.
20
[24] K. Chaudhuri and N. Mishra. When Random Sam-
pling Preserves Privacy. In Proceedings of the 26th An-
nual International Conference on Advances in Cryptol-
ogy (CRYPTO), 2006.
[25] S. Chaudhuri, G. Das, and V. Narasayya. Optimized
Stratified Sampling for Approximate Query Processing.
Proceedings of ACM Transaction of Database Systems
(TODS), 2007.
[26] R. Chen, I. E. Akkus, and P. Francis. SplitX: High-
performance Private Analytics. In Proceedings of the
Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architec-
tures, and Protocols for Computer Communications
(SIGCOMM), 2013.
[27] R. Chen, A. Reznichenko, P. Francis, and J. Gehrke. To-
wards Statistical Queries over Distributed Private User
Data. In Presented as part of the 9th USENIX Sympo-
sium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
(NSDI), 2012.
[28] ComScore Reaches $14 Million Settle-
ment in Electronic Privacy Class Action.
http://www.alstonprivacy.com/
comscore-reaches-14-million-settlement-in-electronic-privacy-class-action.
Accessed: Jan, 2017.
[29] T. Condie, N. Conway, P. Alvaro, J. M. Hellerstein,
K. Elmeleegy, and R. Sears. MapReduce Online. In Pro-
ceedings of the 7th USENIX Conference on Networked
Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI), 2010.
[30] G. Cormode, M. Garofalakis, P. J. Haas, and C. Jer-
maine. Synopses for Massive Data: Samples, His-
tograms, Wavelets, Sketches. Found. Trends databases,
2012.
[31] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson. Tor:
The second-generation onion router. Technical report,
DTIC Document, 2004.
[32] J. R. Douceur. The Sybil Attack. In Proceedings
of 1st International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
(IPTPS), 2002.
[33] C. Dwork. Differential privacy. In Proceedings of the
33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages
and Programming, part II (ICALP), 2006.
[34] C. Dwork, K. Kenthapadi, F. McSherry, I. Mironov, and
M. Naor. Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy Via Distributed
Noise Generation. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual In-
ternational Conference on The Theory and Applications
of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), 2006.
[35] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. Cali-
brating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis. In
Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryp-
tography (TCC), 2006.
[36] C. Dwork, M. Naor, T. Pitassi, and G. N. Rothblum. Dif-
ferential privacy under continual observation. In Pro-
ceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Comput-
ing (STOC), 2010.
[37] C. Dwork and A. Roth. The algorithmic foundations of
differential privacy. Foundations and Trends in Theoret-
ical Computer Science, 9(3-4):211–407, 2014.
[38] D. M. Dziuda. Data mining for genomics and pro-
teomics: analysis of gene and protein expression data.
John Wiley & Sons, 2010.
[39] B. Efron and R. Tibshirani. Bootstrap Methods for Stan-
dard Errors, Confidence Intervals, and Other Measures
of Statistical Accuracy. Statistical Science, 1986.
[40] J. A. Fox and P. E. Tracy. Randomized response: a
method for sensitive surveys. Beverly Hills California
Sage Publications, 1986.
[41] A. Friedman, I. Sharfman, D. Keren, and A. Schus-
ter. Privacy-Preserving Distributed Stream Monitoring.
In Proceedings of the Symposium on Network and Dis-
tributed System Security (NDSS), 2014.
[42] A. S. Ganapathi. Predicting and optimizing system uti-
lization and performance via statistical machine learn-
ing. In Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2009-181,
2009.
[43] M. N. Garofalakis and P. B. Gibbon. Approximate
Query Processing: Taming the TeraBytes. In Proceed-
ings of the International Conference on Very Large Data
Bases (VLDB), 2001.
[44] J. Gehrke, M. Hay, E. Lui, and R. Pass. Crowd-
blending privacy. In Proceedings of the 32nd Annual
International Conference on Advances in Cryptology
(CRYPTO), 2012.
[45] J. Gehrke, E. Lui, and R. Pass. Towards Privacy for So-
cial Networks: A Zero-Knowledge Based Definition of
Privacy. In Theory of Cryptography, 2011.
[46] I. Goiri, R. Bianchini, S. Nagarakatte, and T. D. Nguyen.
ApproxHadoop: Bringing Approximations to MapRe-
duce Frameworks. In Proceedings of the Twentieth
International Conference on Architectural Support for
Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASP-
LOS), 2015.
[47] O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. How to Play
any Mental Game or A Completeness Theorem for Pro-
tocols with Honest Majority. In STOC, 1987.
[48] S. D. Gordon, T. Malkin, M. Rosulek, and H. Wee.
Multi-party Computation of Polynomials and Branch-
ing Programs without Simultaneous Interaction. In Pro-
ceedings of the Annual International Conference on Ad-
vances in Cryptology (EUROCRYPT), 2013.
[49] S. Guha, B. Cheng, and P. Francis. Privad: Practical
Privacy in Online Advertising. In Proceedings of the
8th Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Im-
plementation (NSDI), 2011.
[50] S. Guha, M. Jain, and V. N. Padmanabhan. Koi: A
location-privacy platform for smartphone apps. In Pre-
sented as part of the 9th USENIX Symposium on Net-
worked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI),
2012.
[51] V. Gulisano, V. Tudor, M. Almgren, and M. Papatri-
antafilou. BES: Differentially Private and Distributed
Event Aggregation in Advanced Metering Infrastruc-
tures. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM International
Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security (CPSS),
2016.
[52] T. Gupta, N. Crooks, W. Mulhern, S. Setty, L. Alvisi,
and M. Walfish. Scalable and Private Media Consump-
tion with Popcorn. In Proceedings of 13th USENIX Sym-
21
posium on Networked Systems Design and Implementa-
tion (NSDI), 2016.
[53] T. h. Hubert Chan, E. Shi, and D. Song. Privacy-
preserving stream aggregation with fault tolerance. In
Proceedings of 16th International Conference on Finan-
cial Cryptography and Data Security (FC), 2012.
[54] A. Haeberlen, B. C. Pierce, and A. Narayan. Differential
Privacy Under Fire. In Proceedings of the 20th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security), 2011.
[55] M. Hardt and S. Nath. Privacy-aware personalization
for mobile advertising. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS), 2012.
[56] M. Hay, V. Rastogi, G. Miklau, and D. Suciu. Boost-
ing the Accuracy of Differentially Private Histograms
Through Consistency. Proceedings of the International
Conference on Very Large Data Bases (VLDB), 2010.
[57] HealthCare.gov Sends Personal Data to Dozens
of Tracking Websites. https://www.eff.
org/deeplinks/2015/01/healthcare.
gov-sends-personal-data. Accessed: Jan,
2017.
[58] J. M. Hellerstein, P. J. Haas, and H. J. Wang. Online
Aggregation. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMOD In-
ternational Conference on Management of Data (SIG-
MOD), 1997.
[59] S. Jarecki and V. Shmatikov. Efficient Two-Party Se-
cure Computation on Committed Inputs. In Proceedings
of the Annual International Conference on Advances in
Cryptology (EUROCRYPT), 2007.
[60] Z. Jerzak and H. Ziekow. The debs 2015 grand
challenge. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Interna-
tional Conference on Distributed Event-Based Systems
(DEBS), 2015.
[61] V. Karwa, S. Raskhodnikova, A. Smith, and
G. Yaroslavtsev. Private analysis of graph struc-
ture. In Proceedings of the International Conference on
Very Large Data Bases (VLDB), 2011.
[62] S. P. Kasiviswanathan, H. K. Lee, K. Nissim,
S. Raskhodnikova, and A. Smith. What Can We Learn
Privately? SIAM J. Comput.
[63] D. R. Krishnan, D. L. Quoc, P. Bhatotia, C. Fetzer, and
R. Rodrigues. IncApprox: A Data Analytics System for
Incremental Approximate Computing. InProceedings of
International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW),
2016.
[64] J. Lee and C. Clifton. How Much is Enough? Choosing
ε for Differential Privacy. In Proceedings of the 14th
International Conference on Information Security (ISC),
2011.
[65] S. Lee, E. L. Wong, D. Goel, M. Dahlin, and
V. Shmatikov. piBox: A Platform for Privacy-Preserving
Apps. In Presented as part of the 10th USENIX Sympo-
sium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
(NSDI), 2013.
[66] C. Li, M. Hay, V. Rastogi, G. Miklau, and A. McGregor.
Optimizing Linear Counting Queries Under Differential
Privacy. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-
SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems
(PODS), 2010.
[67] Y. Lindell and B. Pinkas. An Efficient Protocol for Se-
cure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Mali-
cious Adversaries. In Proceedings of the Annual Inter-
national Conference on Advances in Cryptology (EU-
ROCRYPT), 2007.
[68] Y. Lindell and B. Pinkas. An Efficient Protocol for Se-
cure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Mali-
cious Adversaries. J. Cryptology, 2015.
[69] S. Mallick, G. Hains, and C. S. Deme. A resource pre-
diction model for virtualization servers. In Proceedings
of International Conference on High Performance Com-
puting and Simulation (HPCS), 2012.
[70] M. M. Masud, C. Woolam, J. Gao, L. Khan, J. Han,
K. W. Hamlen, and N. C. Oza. Facing the reality of
data stream classification: coping with scarcity of la-
beled data. Knowledge and information systems, 2012.
[71] F. McSherry. Privacy Integrated Queries. In Proceedings
of ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Manage-
ment of Data (SIGMOD), 2009.
[72] F. McSherry and R. Mahajan. Differentially-private Net-
work Trace Analysis. In Proceedings of the Confer-
ence on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and
Protocols for Computer Communications (SIGCOMM),
2010.
[73] P. Mohan, A. Thakurta, E. Shi, D. Song, and D. Culler.
GUPT: Privacy Preserving Data Analysis Made Easy. In
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM SIGMOD International
Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD), 2012.
[74] D. S. Moore. The Basic Practice of Statistics. W. H.
Freeman & Co., 2nd edition, 1999.
[75] A. Narayan and A. Haeberlen. DJoin: Differentially Pri-
vate Join Queries over Distributed Databases. In Pro-
ceedings of the 10th USENIX Conference on Operating
Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI), 2012.
[76] N. Pansare, V. R. Borkar, C. Jermaine, and T. Condie.
Online Aggregation for Large MapReduce Jobs. Pro-
ceedings of the International Conference on Very Large
Data Bases (VLDB), 2011.
[77] B. Pinkas, T. Schneider, N. P. Smart, and S. C. Williams.
Secure Two-Party Computation Is Practical. In Proceed-
ings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory
and Application of Cryptology and Information Secu-
rity: Advances in Cryptology (ASIACRYPT), 2009.
[78] O. Pons. Bootstrap of means under stratified sampling.
Electronic Journal of Statistics, 2007.
[79] Privacy Lawsuit Targets Net Giants Over ‘Zombie’
Cookies. http://www.wired.com/2010/07/
zombie-cookies-lawsuit. Accessed: Jan, 2017.
[80] D. Proserpio, S. Goldberg, and F. McSherry. Cali-
brating Data to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis: A
Platform for Differentially-private Analysis of Weighted
Datasets. Proceedings of the International Conference
on Very Large Data Bases (VLDB), 2014.
[81] D. L. Quoc, M. Beck, P. Bhatotia, R. Chen, C. Fet-
zer, and T. Strufe. PrivApprox: Privacy-Preserving
22
Stream Analytics. In Proceedings of the 2017 USENIX
Conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
(USENIX ATC), 2017.
[82] D. L. Quoc, R. Chen, P. Bhatotia, C. Fetzer, V. Hilt, and
T. Strufe. StreamApprox: Approximate Computing for
Stream Analytics. 2017.
[83] V. Rastogi and S. Nath. Differentially private aggrega-
tion of distributed time-series with transformation and
encryption. In Proceedings of the International Confer-
ence on Management of Data (SIGMOD), 2010.
[84] M. G. Reed, P. F. Syverson, and D. M. Goldschlag.
Anonymous connections and onion routing. IEEE Jour-
nal on Selected Areas in Communications, 1998.
[85] I. Roy, S. T. V. Setty, A. Kilzer, V. Shmatikov, and
E. Witchel. Airavat: Security and Privacy for MapRe-
duce. In Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Conference on
Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI),
2010.
[86] N. Santos, R. Rodrigues, K. P. Gummadi, and S. Saroiu.
Policy-Sealed Data: A New Abstraction for Building
Trusted Cloud Services . In Proceedings of the USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security), 2012.
[87] SEC Charges Two Employees of a Credit Card Com-
pany with Insider Trading. http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2015/lr23179.
htm. Accessed: Jan, 2017.
[88] E. Shi, T. H. Chan, E. G. Rieffel, R. Chow, and D. Song.
Privacy-Preserving Aggregation of Time-Series Data. In
Proceedings of the Symposium on Network and Dis-
tributed System Security (NDSS), 2011.
[89] K. Singh, S. Bhola, and W. Lee. xbook: Redesigning
privacy control in social networking platforms. In Pro-
ceedings of the 18th Conference on USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX Security), 2009.
[90] S. K. Thompson. Sampling. Wiley Series in Probability
and Statistics, 2012.
[91] E. U´lfar, P. Vasyl, and K. Aleksandra. RAPPOR: Ran-
domized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Re-
sponse. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security (CCS),
2014.
[92] B. Viswanath, E. Kiciman, and S. Saroiu. Keeping In-
formation Safe from Social Networking Apps. In Pro-
ceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Social
Networks (WOSN’12), 2012.
[93] G. Wang, B. Wang, T. Wang, A. Nika, H. Zheng, and
B. Y. Zhao. Defending against sybil devices in crowd-
sourced mapping services. In Proceedings of the 14th
Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems,
Applications, and Services (MobiSys), 2016.
[94] Q. Wang, Y. Zhang, X. Lu, Z. Wang, Z. Qin, and K. Ren.
RescueDP: Real-time Spatio-temporal Crowd-sourced
Data Publishing with Differential Privacy. In Proceed-
ings of the 35th Annual IEEE International Conference
on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), 2016.
[95] S. L.Warner. Randomized response: A survey technique
for eliminating evasive answer bias. In Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 1965.
[96] L. Waye. Privacy integrated data stream queries. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2014 International Workshop on Privacy
& Security in Programming (PSP), 2014.
[97] A. Wieder, P. Bhatotia, A. Post, and R. Rodrigues.
Brief Announcement: Modelling MapReduce for Opti-
mal Execution in the Cloud. In Proceedings of the 29th
ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of Dis-
tributed Computing (PODC), 2010.
[98] A. Wieder, P. Bhatotia, A. Post, and R. Rodrigues. Con-
ductor: Orchestrating the Clouds. In Proceedings of the
4th international workshop on Large Scale Distributed
Systems and Middleware (LADIS), 2010.
[99] A. Wieder, P. Bhatotia, A. Post, and R. Rodrigues.
Orchestrating the Deployment of Computations in the
Cloud with Conductor. In Proceedings of the 9th
USENIX symposium on Networked Systems Design and
Implementation (NSDI), 2012.
[100] D. P. Woodruff. Revisiting the Efficiency of Malicious
Two-Party Computation. In Proceedings of the 26th An-
nual International Conference on Advances in Cryptol-
ogy (EUROCRYPT), 2007.
[101] A. C. Yao. Protocols for Secure Computations. In Pro-
ceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science (SFCS), 1982.
[102] K. Zeng, S. Agarwal, A. Dave, M. Armbrust, and I. Sto-
ica. G-OLA: Generalized On-Line Aggregation for In-
teractive Analysis on Big Data. In Proceedings of the
2015 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Man-
agement of Data (SIGMOD), 2015.
23
